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Abstract- The exploitation of oil and gas in the Niger Delta of Nigeria is the foremost source 
of revenue of Nigeria, reportedly providing 20% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 95% 
of foreign exchange earnings, and about 65% of budgetary revenues of Nigeria. With this 
strategic position of the area and the tensions between the Federal Government of Nigeria and 
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) directly exploiting these resources, on the one hand, and 
the ethnic communities where these resources are derived, on the other, there is a need to take 
various steps to seek to deescalate the situation in this region. This article argues that a key 
way to douse tension in this region is to develop new legal and tripartite contractual 
arrangements with regard to the oil and gas sector that would involve a direct stake for oil 
producing communities in oil and gas operations in the region. It further examines some of the 
potential complexities that may arise if contracts are directly negotiated with the communities 
by the MNCs without the involvement of the Federal Government of Nigeria as the host state 
government. 
 
Key words – Niger Delta; Oil and Gas; Ownership; Indigenous Peoples; Multinational 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Multinational corporations (MNCs) have employed a number of ways to advance their business 
objectives in conflict resource regions, including corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
initiatives, undertaken through community development and social infrastructure projects. Yet, 
incessant community conflicts and opposition to MNCs’ activities in resource rich regions of 
the world point to the need for new rules of engagement to deal with the phenomenon described 
as the ‘force of the community.’3 Such communities seek to move from engagement with 
MNCs based on corporate philanthropy to community empowerment derived from greater 
participation and involvement in the control, exploitation and management of their natural 
resources. The execution of direct corporate-community agreements between MNCs and 
indigenous communities has been proposed as a key means of effective engagement with the 
force of the community.4 This of course would entail the reshaping of the current bilateral 
relationship between MNCs and host state governments to include local communities. It would 
                                                 
3
 Anna Zalik, The Niger Delta: ‘Petro violence’ and ‘partnership development 31(101) REVIEW OF 
AFRICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY,  401-424 (2004)  and Anna Zalik, Oil Futures: Shell’s ‘Trilemma 
Triangle’ and the ‘Force of Community’, Paper Presented at the Environmental Politics Colloquium, Institute 
for International Studies, University of California at Berkeley, (November 3, 2006), available at 
http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/bwep/colloquium/papers/Zalik2006.pdf 
4
 See for example, Ciaran, O'Faircheallaigh, Aboriginal – Mining Company Contractual Agreements in Australia 
and Canada: Implications for Political Autonomy and Community Development, vol. XXX, nos. 1-2 CANADIAN 
JOURNAL OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES, 69-86 (2010) 
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also involve the renegotiation of current contractual and legal structures that currently regulate 
this relationship.  The case for the renegotiation of traditional contracts is premised on the 
ground that these contracts at present merely promote the objectives of MNCs and host 
governments, without taking into consideration the developmental needs of the ethnic 
communities directly hosting MNCs’ operational facilities and activities.  Using the Niger 
Delta region of Nigeria as a case-study of where the force of community has occurred, this 
article will explore the issues that have given rise to these propositions for new legal and 
contractual arrangements with regard to the oil and gas sector. The oil and gas rich region of 
the Niger Delta of Nigeria has been chosen because the exploitation of oil and gas in that area 
is the foremost source of revenue of Nigeria, reportedly providing 20% of the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), 95% of foreign exchange earnings, and about 65% of budgetary revenues of 
the Country. This crucial role of oil and gas in Nigeria has resulted in tensions between the 
Federal Government of Nigeria and MNCs directly exploiting these resources, on the one hand, 
and the ethnic communities where these resources are derived, on the other.5 This article argues 
that a key way to douse tension in this region is to develop new legal and tripartite contractual 
arrangements with regard to the oil and gas sector that would involve a direct stake for oil 
producing communities in oil and gas operations in the region. It further examines some of the 
potential complexities that may arise if such contracts are directly negotiated with the 
communities by the MNCs without due involvement of the federal government of Nigeria as 
the host state government. 
 
II. UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMUNITY IN THE 
NIGERIAN CONTEXT 
Collins points out that though the concept of community is of common usage it is in reality 
an extremely difficult one to define as it may mean a variety of things to different people.6 
She posits out that it may cover a diverse range of groupings such as ‘… a place-based 
                                                 
5
 See Nigerian High Commission, London, UK website, available at http://www.nigeriahc.org.uk/economy Also 
see for a more academic analysis of this Augustine Ikelegbe, The Economy of Conflict in the Oil Rich Niger Delta 
Region of Nigeria, 14(2) NORDIC JOURNAL OF AFRICAN STUDIES, 208-234(2005). However, it must be 
pointed out that the principles that would be enunciated in this paper remains relevant for other natural resources 
in Nigeria, as it is a nation endowed with diverse natural resources, such as tin, gold, bauxite, iron ore, coal, 
limestone, niobium, lead and zinc, which technically are subject to the same principles as the oil and gas situation. 
This is particularly relevant as the Nation seeks to diversify from a mono-culture economy subject to the whims 
and caprices of a rather volatile international oil and gas market price. 
6
 Patricia Hill Collins, The New Politics of Community, 75(1) AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW, 7, 10-
12(2010). 
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neighborhood; a way of life associated with a group of people; or a shared cultural ethos of a 
race, national or ethnic group, or religious collectivity …’7 Further, Anderson, in his seminal 
piece, submits that all communities larger than the primordial face to face village contact are 
essentially imagined. 8 He argues that: ‘[c]ommunities are to be distinguished, not by their 
falsity/genuiness, but by the style in which they are imagined.’9 Thus, as the concept of 
community is a rather imprecise one it is helpful, at this point, to seek to explore different 
ways in which the concept can be imagined in Nigeria and the sense in which this may 
applied in the context of the so called force of the community in the Niger Delta situation. 
 
A.   Community as a Constitutional Concept 
Although Anderson defines a nation as merely ‘…an imagined political community…,’10 it is 
critical to first consider the notion of a community as a constitutional concept, especially for 
a nation, such as Nigeria, which operates a written constitution. The current Nigerian 
constitution is the 1999 constitution, which is regarded as the supreme law of the land, with 
binding force on all authorities and persons throughout the country.11 The constitution is 
explicit that Nigeria operates a three tier system of government, namely: Federal, States 
(currently 36 in number) and Local Government Areas (in the case of the Federal capital, 
Abuja, the Area Councils), the list of States, Local Government Areas and Area Councils are 
specified in the first schedule of the Constitution.12 This three tier system may be said to 
represent three strata of ‘imagined communities.’ While the Constitution unequivocally 
specifies the Federal, States and Local Government Areas (the Area Councils in Abuja) 
communities, it fails to specifically mention the various ethnic communities or groups, which 
by reason of colonialism and the infamous Berlin Conference 1884-1885, were brought 
together under what subsequently became the sovereign state of Nigeria. These ethnic 
communities, reported to be over 250, include those located in the Niger Delta region of 
                                                 
7
 Id. at 11 
8
 See Benedict Anderson, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD 
OF NATIONALISM 15 (1983) who points out that all communities larger than the primordial face to face village 
contact are imagined. 
9
 Id. 
10
 Id. 
11
 See Section 1(1). While Section 1(3) of the Constitution states that any other law that is inconsistent with this 
fundamental basic law is to the extent of such inconsistency null and void. 
12
 See Sections 2 and 3, as well as Schedule 1 of the 1999 Constitution. 
 5 
Nigeria, such as the Ijaws, Ogonis, Urhobos, Itsekiris, Isokos, Illajes, Etches, Ndonis, 
Ikwerres, Andonis, Effiks, Ibibios, Edos, Ikas, and to some extent the ibos,13  
 
As would be seen, as we develop arguments in this article, the Constitution explicitly 
recognizes certain rights to access the revenue derived from the resources located in Nigeria 
for what may be regarded as the specified ‘imagined’ communities, especially the Nation-
State represented by the Federal government and the unit States of the Federation.  It does 
this by vesting the Nation- State’s ownership of all minerals, minerals oils and natural gas 
whether located in under or upon and land or in, under or upon the territorial sea and the 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of Nigeria in the Government of the Federation to be 
managed in a manner prescribed by the National Assembly.14 While for the unit States of the 
Federation, the Constitution recognizes that they receive a slice of the ‘national cake’ 
resulting from exploitation of natural resources through a ‘derivation formula’, currently 13% 
of revenue accruing to the Federation Account directly from exploitation of natural resources 
located within the State, specifically incorporated into the Constitution.15 In Section 162(2) it 
states: 
 
“The President, upon the receipt of advice from the Revenue Mobilization 
Allocation and Fiscal Commission, shall table before the National Assembly 
proposals for revenue allocation from the Federation Account, and in determining 
the formula, the National Assembly shall take into account, the allocation 
principles especially those of population, equality of States, internal revenue 
generation, land mass, terrain as well as population density. Provided that the 
principle of derivation shall be constantly reflected in any approved formula as 
being not less than thirteen per cent of the revenue accruing to the Federation 
Account directly from any natural resources." (Italics for emphasis) 
 
                                                 
13
 Edwin Egede, Human Rights and the Environment: Is there a Legally Enforceable Right of a Clean and Healthy 
Environment for the “Peoples” of the Niger Delta under the Framework of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria?, 19(1) SRI LANKA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 51, 54-55(2007)  and See 
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), THE WORLD FACT BOOK(2014), available at 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html 
14
 Section 44(3) of the Constitution. See infra Part II (A) where this is developed further. 
15
 See infra Part IVA. Also see Edwin Egede, Who Owns the Nigerian Offshore Seabed: Federal or States? 
An Examination of the Attorney General of the Federation v. Attorney General of Abia State &35 Ors 
Case, 49(1) JOURNAL OF AFRICAN LAW, 73, 73-74 (2005) See also Kaniye Ebeku, Nigerian Supreme 
Court and ownership of offshore oil, 27 NATURAL RESOURCES FORUM 291-299 (2003), for an 
analysis of the historical context of the derivation principle. 
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While there have been calls for the increase of the derivation formula, with some demanding 
that it goes as high as 50%, especially for oil and gas producing unit States in the Niger Delta 
area,16 it is doubtful that this would solve the agitations by the ethnic communities. On the 
other hand, though the local government areas and council areas do not specifically receive 
any revenue allocation through the ‘derivation formula’, they do receive some share of the 
general revenue accruing to the Federation account under the Constitution via the States 
where they are located.17 Since the ethnic communities are not one of the ‘imagined’ 
communities explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, there is no particular provision under 
the Constitution for them to receive direct disbursement from the revenue generated from the 
resources exploited within their territory. This therefore helps to understand why there is the 
notion of the so-called ‘force of the community’ by some of these ethnic communities, who 
feel marginalized and exploited, as a result of not having direct access at least to some part of 
the revenue generated from resources extracted from their respective territories.  
 
Ordinarily the three tier communities – Federal, unit-States and local government 
areas/council areas, as the case may be – explicitly mentioned in the Constitution should 
adequately represent the interest of the various ethnic communities within their sphere of 
jurisdiction, in respect of, amongst other things, revenue derived from the exploitation of 
resources within the respective territories of such ethnic communities, since under the 
Constitution they are meant to be democratically elected representatives of the people.18 But 
does Nigeria truly have a demos consisting of the various ethnic communities in Nigeria that 
regards the various constitutional communities populated by apparently elected 
representatives as validly reflecting ‘power to the people’ with regard to resource 
disbursement and benefits? As we explore in the next section looking at community as a 
political concept, we see a disconnect between the communities explicitly recognized in the 
Constitution, which constitute the Westphalian State structure, and the ethnic communities 
leading the latter, notably those in the Niger Delta area, where the bulk of Nigeria’s national 
                                                 
16
 Chris Eze, Nigeria: New Revenue Formula - Niger Delta Demands 50 Percent Derivation, DAILY TRUST 
NIGERIAN NEWSPAPER (11 October 2013), available at http://allafrica.com/stories/201310110635.html  
17
 See Sections 162(5), (6) and (7) of the 1999 Constitution. 
18
 Nigeria on the 29th of May, 1999 resumed its status as a democratic State once again after several years of 
military rule. As would be recalled, the word ‘democracy’ is derived from the Greek word dēmokratia that 
encompasses two words – demos (meaning People) – and - kratia (meaning power or rule), in essence meaning 
‘power to the people.’ 
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revenue is derived from exploitation of oil and gas, to agitate for some kind of stake in the 
resources exploited from their territory under a broad rather nebulous phrase of ‘resource 
control.’19 A key point we therefore make in this article is that a way to deescalate such 
tensions is for these ethnic communities to have some sort of direct stake in the resources 
located within their territory, a proposition which should eventually be incorporated into the 
Constitution, thereby including ethnic communities as an additional ‘imagined community in 
the supreme law of the land. 
 
B.   Community as a Political Concept 
The historical landscape of Nigeria traced back to colonialism and the lumping together of a 
number of ethnic groups to make up the Sovereign State of Nigeria has led scholars, notably 
Ekeh, to theorize on the concept of two publics in Nigeria. Ekeh points out that:  
“…there are two public realms in post-colonial Africa, with different types of 
moral linkages to the private realm. At one level is the public realm in which 
primordial groupings, ties, and sentiments influence and determine the individual’s 
public behaviour.  I shall call this the primordial public because it is closely 
identified with primordial groupings, sentiments, and activities, which nevertheless 
impinge on the public interest. The primordial public is moral and operates on the 
same moral imperatives as the private realm. On the other hand, there is a public 
realm which is historically associated with the colonial administration and which 
has become identified with popular politics in post-colonial Africa. It is based on 
civil structures: the military, the civil service, the police etc. Its chief characteristics 
is that it has no moral linkages with the private realm. I shall call this the civic 
public. The civic public in Africa is amoral and lacks the generalized moral 
imperatives operative in the private realm and in the primordial public.”20 
 
He pinpoints here two ‘imagined’ political communities – the so-called civic public, on the 
one hand, centered around the Westphalian structures introduced by the ‘colonial masters,’ 
along with its accompanying institutional and political structures, and, on the other hand, the 
primordial public focused on the ethnic community where the individual comes from, with 
such individual having more allegiance to the latter. Obviously, like most theories, Ekeh’s so-
called civic- primordial public distinction suffers the obvious danger of generalization and 
over-simplification of the rather complex situation in post-colonial Africa. Clearly not all 
                                                 
19
 Listening to various discussions of this concept there appears to be a lack of clarity on whether this is intended 
to cover resource ownership or merely greater participation by ethnic communities in whose territory the resource 
is derived. 
20
 Peter Ekeh, Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement 17(1) COMPARATIVE 
STUDIES IN SOCIETY AND HISTORY, 91, 92(1975) 
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post-colonial Africa’s challenges may be traced back to the civic-primordial dichotomy. 
Further this dichotomy does not explain why in a number of cases certain leaders in Africa, 
who eventually emerge as Presidents, Prime Ministers, and Governors etc., do not necessarily 
during their tenure take tangible steps to develop their respective ethnic communities.21 
Notwithstanding, the civic-primordial dichotomy does serve as a rational and beneficial 
theoretical toolkit to help to understand the current agitation of ethnic communities in the 
Niger Delta for a better deal in resource disbursement under the existing constitutional 
structures. Further, it provides valuable insight into what may be regarded as theoretical 
paradox. First, as we see from the discourse above of community as a constitutional concept, 
that ownership of natural resources are vested in the Federal Government of Nigeria and the 
derivation principle benefits resource-rich States, populated by apparently duly elected 
representatives of the Nigerian people. Is it not somewhat paradoxical that these ethnic 
communities should not regard such duly elected officials as adequately representing their 
interest with regard to resource control and fiscal disbursement?  Ekeh’s civic-primordial 
dichotomy helps to shed some light on this. As Berman points out, the idea of the so-called 
two publics in Ekeh’s analysis mainly helps us to appreciate where social trust is situate – the 
primordial rather than the civic.22  
 
C. Conceptualizing the Force of the Community 
The force of community springs from grass-root activities and collective solidarity. It is 
described in works, such as Faulkner, as the invisible living force that exerts its influence over 
individuals within its structures. 23  It operates in a ‘non-coercive space that regulates 
autonomous individuals through fully chosen, agreed to and peaceful relations.’ 24 In this 
regard the force of community is seen to have developed through a bottom up approach rather 
than prescriptive state control. But it has been questioned whether the force of community is 
completely devoid of direct state control since there is an inter-penetration between state and 
community spheres.25 What is, however, worth noting is that these critical discussions on the 
                                                 
21
 See for instance, Claude Eke, What is the Problem of Ethnicity in Africa 22 TRANSFORMATION, 1-14, 
(1992) who points out that ethnicity is sometimes manipulated by the political elites for their selfish purposes. 
22
 Bruce Berman, Ethnicity, Bureaucracy and Democracy: The Politics of Trust, in Bruce Berman, Dickson Eyoh,  
and Will Kymlicka(eds.), ETHNICITY AND DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA, 38, 47 (2004). 
23
 Cleanth Brooks, WILLIAM FAULKNER: THE YOKNAPATAWPHA COUNTRY, 499(1963). 
24
 George, Pavlich, The Force of Community in Heather Strang and John Braithwaite, (eds) RESTORATIVE 
JUSTICE AND CIVIL SOCIETY, 56, 57 (2001). 
25
 Id. 
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force of community or community control are construed from Western perspectives and as 
such they may not fully represent how the force of community has developed in other regions 
of the world such as sub- Saharan Africa. It is thus beneficial to examine briefly the force of 
community from African perspectives of communalism.  This article does not seek to provide 
an exhaustive treatise of African communalism but merely seeks to contextualize how the force 
of community may operate in contested natural resource regions such as the Niger Delta. While 
there may be no one singular construction on what constitutes community in Africa, it is clear 
that group solidarity as described by the Zulu maxim umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu (a person is 
a person through other persons) is an important part of African consciousness.26 Works, like 
Ekeh, as pointed out somewhere above, establish that the group solidarity in post-colonial Sub-
Saharan Africa extends beyond mere allegiance to the civic public national state but to a 
primordial public represented, by family and ethnic groupings. Thus communities within the 
region would identify more with the primordial public than the so-called civic public state. It 
has been argued that Ekeh’s two publics does provide some explanation as to how the force of 
community has evolved in the Niger Delta and why resource control is considered a core 
aspiration of oil producing communities. 27  While the quest for greater participation in the 
control of mineral resources in the region has been expressed in some part in armed conflict 
and contraband oil trade, these activities of the force of community when understood in the 
light of the two publics can be seen as having re-distributional objectives of protecting the 
interests of the primordial public against exploitation by the civic public.28   
 
Although these discussions on how the force of community has developed in the Niger Delta 
are largely derived from social science literature, they do shed some light on the anomalies in 
the current legislative and contractual framework governing the control and management of 
mineral resources that are extracted from this region. In reality, it can be argued that the 
evolution of the force of community in the Niger Delta and its anti-oil protests is a legitimate 
response to the marginalization of the primordial public within oil producing communities who 
have had their landholdings and mineral ownership rights transferred to the civic public 
                                                 
26
 Augustine Shutte, Umuntu Ngumuntu Ngabantu:An African Conception of Humanity, 5(1) PHILOSOPHY 
AND THEOLOGY 39, 46 (1990). 
27
 Ekeh, Supra note 20 at 108 and Zalik, Supra note 3 at 12 
28
 Zalik Id. 
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Nigerian State.29 This point shall be developed further in this article when considering in more 
details the current legal framework governing the ownership and control of mineral resources 
in Nigeria.30 Before moving on to explore this point further, it is vital here to consider other 
constructions of the force of community particularly those that have emerged within the 
business discourse. This is critical as the force of community in the Niger Delta is not only a 
reaction to the marginalization of the primordial public by a civil public national state, but also 
a response to impact that globalization exemplified by the commercial activities of large 
multinational companies (MNCs).  
 
 
D. Corporate Constructions of the Force of the Community: the Shell Trilemma 
Model 
Beyond the constructions of the force of community developed in the social science 
literature; other interpretations of this phenomenon have emerged in business discourse. 31  
Unlike the social science interpretations of the force of community which primarily focuses 
on the synergy between community and state control to the exclusion of other stakeholders, 
the business discourse literature further identifies the significance of trade-offs between the 
nation-state, the MNCs and the community in order to achieve suitable outcomes that would 
promote efficiency in natural resource exploitation. 32 The need for such trade-offs, and the 
adverse effect of a failure to achieve trade-offs between the nation State and the MNCs, on 
the one hand, and the community, on the other hand, may be illustrated by the well-known 
Ken Saro-Wiwa incidence in 1995. Here the then military government of Nigeria arranged 
for the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa, who was one of the leaders of the Movement for the 
Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), agitating for social and environmental justice for the 
Ogoni community from the Nigerian government and the MNCs, notably Shell, involved in 
exploitation in the Ogoniland.  Shell was regarded as being complicit in this execution and 
this had a serious impact on their business operations leading them to withdraw for a while 
                                                 
29
 Id. and Jedrzej Frynas, Corporate and state responses to anti-oil protests in the Niger Delta, 100 AFRICAN 
AFFAIRS, 27, 32 (2001). 
30
 Infra Part III 
31
 Anna Zalik, Oil ‘futures’: Shell scenarios and the social constitution of the global oil market 41(4) 
GEOFORUM, 553,.554(2010) 
32
 See Shell, Shell Global scenarios to 2025: The future business environment: trends, trade-offs and choices 
(2005), available at http://www.shell.com/content/dam/shell/static/future-energy/downloads/shell-
scenarios/shell-global-scenarios2025summary2005.pdf 
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from Ogoniland with the obvious impact on business efficiency and profits.33 There was 
therefore a need for Shell to change its business model in relation to exploitation and 
engagement with the relevant community. The Shell Global Scenarios 2025 report, for 
example, explores three forces that interact in the course of resource exploitation, namely: 
force of market incentives, force of communities and force of coercion or regulation by the 
State, with these three forces, geared towards three different objectives of efficiency, social 
cohesion and justice, and security respectively.34 These three different forces seeking to 
achieve such diverse objectives thus raises a dilemma or more specifically according to the 
Shell report three dilemmas(or the so-called trilemma) on how to achieve a balance between 
these three objectives. The report adopts this so-called trilemma model approach to interpret 
the force of community and to explain how it competes with the other forces. It examines 
how the demands of these competing forces could be reconciled by setting out potential 
future scenarios that would appreciate the need for trade-offs to achieve some kind of balance 
with regard to the tripartite objectives of efficiency, social cohesion and justice, as well as 
security.35  
 
In the report Shell lays out three possible futures scenarios (or future worlds), stressing that 
these were not meant to be forecasts, but merely an enumeration of credible alternatives for 
the future, especially since the 9/11 terrorist attack on the USA and the Enron infamy. The 
future different scenarios set out by the report with certain identified features are, namely the 
Low Trust Globalization scenario (a ‘prove it to me’ world). This is a skeptical world which 
places emphasis on regulation and compliance. It is   steeped in legalism with a dominance of 
efficiency and security sometimes at the expense of social cohesion and justice. Secondly, the 
Flags scenario (‘follow me’ world). This is a fragmented and polarized world where people 
are dogmatic about their own causes and are very keen to express and promote their own 
identity whether in terms of group/religion/nation/club etc. Here the people distrust the elites 
and even others who do not share their identity. In this scenario the focus is on security and 
social cohesion with little or no regard for market efficiency. Thirdly, the Open doors 
scenario (a ‘know me’ world), a world founded on trust both in the global system and the 
                                                 
33
 Richard Boele, Heike Fabig and David Wheeler, Shell, Nigeria and the Ogoni, A Study in Unsustainable 
Development: The Story of Shell, Nigeria and the Ogoni People – Environment, Economy, Relationships: Conflict 
and Prospects for Resolution, 9 SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, 74-86 (2001) 
34
 Shell, Supra at note 32 
35
 Id.  and Zalik, Supra at note 3. 
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globalization process. It is based on pragmatism and cooperation being the most efficient way 
to engage with and deal with future problems. Here the government is unobtrusive and 
maintains trust and security in a subtle manner using incentives, as well as soft power, rather 
than direct regulation. This world sees efficiency and social cohesion as the main focus. 36  In 
utilizing the trilemma model, the Shell report assumes that it is not viable to focus on a 
utopian outcome that satisfies the demands of all three competing forces or in the reverse to 
focus on utopian outcomes that pit one apex of the triangle against another. Rather, it asserts 
that the better approach is to capture the trade-offs necessary to achieve a “two wins or one 
loss” scenarios that appeal to a broader coalition of actors in the global energy sector. 37   
 
While Oil MNCs, such as Shell, involved in futures scenarios have not explicitly stated 
which scenario is most suited for their operations, it has been argued that the ‘open doors’ 
scenario characterized by incentives and bridges appears to be their preferred option.38 Not 
only does the ‘open doors’ scenario provide stimulus for energy production, in the case of the 
force of community, it also provides a triple bottom line approach where civil society groups 
can work in tandem with companies to address community and investor aspirations in natural 
resource production. On the other hand, the force of community in the ‘flags’ scenario may 
be viewed as having a negative effect on energy production since it is characterized by 
insecurity and conflict fuelled by community agitation and protests. The Niger Delta, a key 
region of Shell’s operations has been held up as one of the worst case of the trilemma’s ‘flag’ 
scenario due to the fact that the force of community has hampered oil shipment contractual 
obligations and forced oil MNCs within the region to declare force majeure due to production 
shut-ins.39   The region thus provides a prime example of how the force of community can 
affect energy production for better or worse. In order to understand the force of the 
community’s impact in the oil rich Niger Delta, it is necessary to provide a précis of the 
dynamics of control and ownership of natural resources in the region. Also, the low trust 
globalization, as can be seen from the Ken Saro Wiwa incidence, is also problematic because 
ignoring social cohesion and justice would eventually have an adverse impact on  
                                                 
36
 Shell, Id. 
37
 Id. 
38
 Zalik, Supra at note 31 at 562-563. 
39
 Jean Balouga, The Niger Delta: Defusing the Time Bomb FIRST QUARTER (INTERNATIONAL 
ASSOCIATION FOR ENERGY ECONOMICS), 8-11, (2009), available at 
https://www.iaee.org/documents/newsletterarticles/109balouga.pdf and Zalik, Supra note 3 at 401-424. 
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III. OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF MINERAL RESOURCES IN THE 
NIGER DELTA – APPLICABLE LAWS 
 
A. Nigerian Domestic Law 
The call for a fair and equitable legal framework to address legitimate community concerns for 
social justice and political relevance of Niger Delta communities in the management and 
control of oil and gas resources is not new. Criticism has been made of Nigerian Federal 
legislation such as the Petroleum Act of 1969, the Land Use Act of 1978 and other 
expropriatory legislation seen as hindering the sustainable development of the region and 
affecting the right of indigenous communities to fully participate in resource ownership and 
management.41 In particular, the Land Use Act promulgated in 1978, which nationalized all 
landholding in Nigeria vesting it with the Nigerian State, is seen by most scholars as one of the 
key ways in which the Nigerian State exercises its ownership rights over oil and gas resources 
in the Niger Delta region to the detriment of the interests of oil producing communities in the 
region. 42  This Act although initially promulgated as a military decree has received 
constitutional fiat in subsequent Nigerian constitutions such as the 1979, 1989 and 1999 
constitutions.43 The current 1999 constitution prohibits the repeal of this legislation except by 
the vote of not less than two-thirds majority of all the members of both houses of the National 
Assembly and the resolution of the Houses of Assemblies of not less than two-thirds of all the 
States in Nigeria.44 Further section 44(3) of the 1999 Constitution strengthens the legislative 
and constitutional case of the Nigerian state ownership of oil and gas resources in the Niger 
Delta and other regions in Nigeria when it states that: 
 
“..the entire property in and control of all mineral, mineral oils and natural gas, in 
under or upon any land in Nigeria or in, under or upon the territorial waters and the 
Exclusive Zone of Nigeria shall vest in the Government of the Federation and shall be 
managed in such manner as may be prescribed by the National Assembly.” 
                                                 
40
 Boele etc. Supra note 33. 
41
 See generally Frynas,Supra at note 29  and Rhuks Ako, Nigeria’s Land Use Act: An anti-thesis to environmental 
justice, 53(2) JOURNAL OF AFRICAN LAW, 289-304(2009). 
42
 For e.g. see Ako, Id. at 293-303. 
43
 Id. 
44
 See s.315 (5) of the Nigerian 1999 Constitution. 
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Other legislation governing the Nigerian oil and gas industry such as the Petroleum Profits Act 
1959, Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) 1990 as amended, the Oil Pipelines Act 1978 and 
the Oil in Navigable Waters Act CAP 337 of 1990 also further reinforce federal ownership of 
mineral resources within the Niger Delta. Revisiting the earlier arguments by Ekeh and Zalik 
on the conflict between the two publics that have arisen in post-colonial African societies,45 it 
can be argued that what we see is a legislative framework that validates the subordination of 
the rights of the primordial public situated in oil producing communities to those of the amoral 
civic public which derives its authority and legitimacy through the State. A consequence of the 
transfer of property rights to the amoral civic public as expressed in the Nigerian State is that 
the primordial public associated with local communities is unable to control or decide how 
mineral resources within their communities are exploited. Following from this are concerns 
that the amoral civic public Nigerian State is aloof to the social and environmental impacts that 
mineral exploitation has had on local communities in the Niger Delta. This is because unlike 
the primordial public, it may be argued that the amoral civic public expressed through the 
Nigerian State does not share the local concerns or  have direct political and moral linkage with 
the communities within this region. This is seen in the context of the Nigerian State repression 
of community protests arising from environmental and economic damage caused to local 
communities by oil operations.46  Accordingly the worst case ‘flag’ scenario of the force of 
community described in the Shell trilemma model can be seen as the natural and inevitable 
reaction of host indigenous communities to the Nigerian Federal State’s disproportionate 
control and ownership of the resources.  This means that any negative impact that the force of 
community has on the commercial operations of investing oil MNCs should be attributed to 
the inadequate constitutional, legislative and contractual recognition of the rights of host oil 
producing communities within the Niger Delta to decide how their mineral resources should 
be exploited. This lack of legal recognition of community rights over mineral resources can 
therefore be seen as key driver of the community tension within this region. 
 
But it is all not negative criticism for the Nigerian State as it has in several legislative and 
judicial reforms attempted to widen and strengthen community participation in the oil and gas 
                                                 
45
 See  notes 27 and 28 above 
46
 Frynas, Supra note 29 at 49 
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industry even if it has not addressed the issue of contractual reforms with similar 
commitment.47  
 
B. International Law 
This section would seek to explore if the various Niger Delta ethnic communities qualify as 
indigenous persons under International Law, and whether as such they have permanent 
sovereignty or ownership over their natural resources.  
 
1.   Niger Delta Ethnic Communities as Indigenous Peoples 
The concept of indigenous peoples in the African continent has been contested because of 
concerns with regard to the absence of aboriginality and subsequent foreign settlers, as seen in 
other places such as Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the USA, in the context of Africa. 
However, the better view is that this concept does exist in Africa.48  For instance, the renowned 
legal scholar on indigenous peoples, Professor Weissner, in an article written as far back as 
1999, though suggesting that little was known about indigenous peoples in Africa, was not 
prepared to deny that this concept was present in the African continent. 49  After some 
ambivalence about whether the concept of indigenous peoples existed in Africa, the African 
Commission established in 2000 a Working Group of Experts on Indigenous 
Populations/Communities mandated amongst other things to explore whether or not indigenous 
                                                 
47
 Infra Part IV 
48
 The traditional definition incorporating the aboriginality/second ‘foreign’ settler approach can be seen in the 
JR Martinez – Cobo Report of the Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations, UN 
Doc. No. E/CN.4/sub.2/1986/7/Add.4, at para.379 which defines the concept as follows: ‘Indigenous 
communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-
colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the 
societies now prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society 
and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their 
cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems.’ In the same vein, Anaya who refers to indigenous peoples 
as: ‘…the living descendants of pre-invasion inhabitants of lands now dominated by others. [They] are culturally 
distinctive groups that find themselves engulfed by settler societies born of the forces of empire and conquest … 
They are indigenous because of their roots are imbedded in the lands in which they live, or would like to live, 
much more deeply than the roots of more powerful sectors of society living on the same lands or in close 
proximity. Furthermore, they are peoples to the extent they comprise distinct communities with a continuity of 
existence and identity that links them to communities, tribes or nations of their ancestral past.’ See James Anaya, 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, 3 (2004). Also on the contested nature of indigenous 
persons in Africa see generally Felix Mukwiza Ndahinda, INDIGENOUSNESS IN AFRICA: A CONTESTED 
LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR EMPOWERMENT OF ‘MARGINALIZED’ COMMUNITIES, (2011)  
49
 Siegfried Wiessner, The Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: A Global Comparative and International 
Legal Analysis, 12 Harvard Human Rights Journal, 57, 89 (1999) 
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populations/communities exist in Africa. 50  In the subsequent report adopted in 2003 the 
Working Group affirmed that indigenous peoples did indeed exist in Africa. Due to the absence 
of an internationally agreed legal definition of indigenous peoples it chose to shun the need to 
have some form of generic universal definition for this concept. It also was not prepared to 
accept that the so-called aboriginal and subsequent foreign settler element, which generally 
does not exist in the context of Africa, was essential to identifying the existence of indigenous 
persons in the African situation.51 The Working group preferred to rely on generic criteria to 
identify indigenous peoples in Africa, who they pointed out were mostly, though not 
exclusively, groups of hunter-gatherers or former hunter-gatherers and groups of pastoralists, 
which they summarized as follows: 
‘…their cultures and ways of life differ considerably from the dominant society 
and their cultures are under threat, in some cases to the extent of extinction. A 
key characteristic for most of them is that the survival of their particular way of 
life depends on access and rights to their traditional land and the natural resources 
thereon. They suffer from discrimination as they are being regarded as less 
developed and less advanced than other more dominant sectors of society. They 
often live in inaccessible regions, often geographically isolated and suffer from 
various forms of marginalisation, both politically and socially. They are subject to 
domination and exploitation within national political and economic structures that 
are commonly designed to reflect the interests and activities of the national 
majority. This discrimination, domination and marginalisation violates their 
human rights as peoples/communities, threatens the continuation of their cultures 
and ways of life and prevents them from being able to genuinely participate in 
deciding on their own future and forms of development.’52 
 
The stance of the Working group has been endorsed by the Advisory Opinion of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples Rights on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples.53 The Niger Delta ethnic groups, who are minority groups in Nigeria, 
a number of whom are fishermen and farmers, occupations that are intrinsically tied up to 
their way of life and require access to their lands and the rivers etc., with their way of life 
truncated by the activities of the MNCs, which has devastated farm lands and polluted the 
                                                 
50
 See ACHPR/Res 51(XXVIII) adopted by the African Commission at its 28th Ordinary Session held in Cotonou, 
Benin, 23 October to 6 November, 2000, available at http://www.achpr.org/mechanisms/indigenous-populations/  
51
 See ACHPR/Res. 65 (XXXIV) Report of the African Commission’s Working Group of Experts on 
Indigenous Populations/Communities, available at  http://www.achpr.org/files/special-mechanisms/indigenous-
populations/expert_report_on_indigenous_communities.pdf  
52
 Id at 60.  
53
 Paras 9-13, Adopted by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights at its 41st Ordinary Session 
held in May 2007 in Accra, Ghana, available at http://www.achpr.org/files/special-mechanisms/indigenous-
populations/un_advisory_opinion_idp_eng.pdf .  
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rivers, have been said to fit into the category of indigenous peoples.54 The Working group, 
for instance, had given the Ogonis of the Niger Delta area of Nigeria as an example of 
pastoralist and agro-pastoralist indigenous peoples in Africa.55 Further, the rather 
comprehensive International Labour Organisation (ILO) and African Commission on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) overview report of the constitutional and legislative protection 
of the rights of indigenous peoples in 24 African States, while acknowledging that it was not 
providing an exhaustive list of indigenous peoples in Africa, also identified the Ogonis, as 
well as the Ijaws, of the Niger Delta as indigenous peoples.56Although, these reports 
highlight what we may regard as ‘high profile’ indigenous peoples in the Niger Delta area, 
such as the Ogonis and Ijaws, there is no logical reason why the status of indigenous peoples 
should not be extended to other ethnic groups in the Niger Delta who could also be said to 
satisfy the generic criteria set out by the Working group to be regarded as indigenous 
peoples.57 With the ethnic communities in the Niger Delta falling under the category of 
indigenous peoples could they have some type of sovereignty over natural resources located 
within their respective territories under international law? 
 
2.  Niger Delta Ethnic Communities’ Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources as 
Indigenous Peoples. 
 
Traditionally, the idea of permanent sovereignty over natural resources was state centered.58 
However, there has been in recent times a trend in international law towards championing the 
permanent sovereignty of indigenous peoples over natural resources within their territory.59  
                                                 
54
 For an excellent analysis of how the Niger delta ethnic communities fit into these criteria see Rhuks Ako and  
Olubayo Oluduro Identifying Beneficiaries of the UN Indigenous Peoples’ Partnership (UNIPP): The Case for 
the Indigenes of Nigeria’s Delta Region, 22(3) AFRICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND 
COMPARATIVE LAW, 369, 380-383 (2014). 
55
  See ACHPR Report, Supra note 51 at 9 
56
 ILO/ACHPR,  THE RESEARCH PROJECT BY THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION 
AND THE AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS ON THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGISLATIVE PROTECTIONS OF THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
IN 24 AFRICAN COUNTRIES, 7 (2009), available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---
normes/documents/publication/wcms_115929.pdf  
57
 Ako and Oluduro, Supra note 54 at 383. 
58
 See for e.g. General Assembly resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962, "Permanent sovereignty over 
natural resources" and the 1974 Charter on the Rights and Duties of States, General Assembly Resolution 
3281(XXIX) of 12 December 1974. 
59
 For an interesting analysis of this trend see Emeka Duruigbo, Permanent Sovereignty and Peoples’ Ownership 
of Natural Resources in In International Law, 38 GEORGE WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW 
REVIEW, 33, 38-67(2006). 
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The Special Rapporteur to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights’ Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Erica-Irene A. Daes, in her 
final report on Indigenous peoples’ permanent sovereignty over natural resources, as one of 
her conclusions stated: 
“Though indigenous peoples’ permanent sovereignty over natural resources has not 
been explicitly recognized in international legal instruments, this right may now be 
said to exist. That is … the right exists in international law by reason of the positive 
recognition of a broad range of human rights held by indigenous peoples, most 
notably the right to own property, the right of ownership of the lands they 
historically or traditionally use and occupy, the rights to self-determination and 
autonomy, the right to development, the right to be free from discrimination, and a 
host of other human rights.”60 
 
The idea of indigenous peoples’ permanent sovereignty over natural resources is not intended 
to create competing claims to sovereignty as between the State and the indigenous peoples 
located within the State. Neither is it intended to confer upon indigenous peoples the ownership 
of natural resources if the domestic laws of the State, as in the case of Nigeria, declare that 
such ownership lies with the government. Miranda points out that that ‘[t]he importance of 
recognizing a “people’s” right to sovereignty over natural resources is that “people” may seek 
to hold States accountable under international law for the misuse of such natural resources.’61  
 This appears to recognize a shift from the concept of absolute sovereignty, whereby the 
government of the State could do whatever it liked with its natural resources, to some kind of 
qualified sovereignty – sovereignty with responsibility - that allows the indigenous peoples in 
whose territory such resources are mined to demand that the government manages the resources 
properly, exploiting it for the maximum benefit of such peoples.62 It is instructive, that the 
major treaty dealing with issues related to indigenous persons, the Convention Concerning 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (No.169) 1989, which entered into 
force on 5 September, 1991, states as follows: 
1. The rights of the peoples concerned to the natural resources pertaining to their lands 
shall be specially safeguarded. These rights include the right of these peoples to 
participate in the use, management and conservation of these resources. 
                                                 
60
 Para.55 of Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion 
and Protection of Human Rights, Fifty-sixth session, Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Indigenous 
Peoples: Indigenous peoples’ permanent sovereignty over natural resources. Final report of the Special 
Rapporteur, Erica-Irene A. Daes, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2004/30 of 13 July 2004 
61
 Lillian Aponte Miranda, The Role of International Law in Intrastate Natural Resource Allocation: Sovereignty, 
Human Rights, and Peoples-Based Development, 45 VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW, 
786, 805, (2012). 
62
 See for e.g. Duruigbo, Supra note 59 at 65-67. 
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2.  In cases in which the State retains the ownership of mineral or sub-surface resources 
or rights to other resources pertaining to lands, governments shall establish or 
maintain procedures through which they shall consult these peoples, with a view to 
ascertaining whether and to what degree their interests would be prejudiced, before 
undertaking or permitting any programmes for the exploration or exploitation of such 
resources pertaining to their lands. The peoples concerned shall wherever possible 
participate in the benefits of such activities, and shall receive fair compensation for 
any damages which they may sustain as a result of such activities. 
 
However, it is interesting to note that only 22 States have so far ratified this Convention. 
Nigeria is notably absent as one of the ratifying States and thus technically not bound by this 
treaty.63 Furthermore, there is no evidence that this treaty could be regarded as reflecting 
customary international law because it lacks the requisite state practice and opinio juris.64 Then 
again, scholars like Anaya and Kingsbury, identify a human rights dimension to the right of 
indigenous peoples’ over their natural resources.65 For instance, the African Charter of Human 
& Peoples Rights states that ‘[a]ll peoples shall freely dispose of their wealth and natural 
resources. This right shall be exercised in the exclusive interest of the people. In no case shall 
a people be deprived of it.’66 This right is an absolute right since ‘in no case shall a people be 
deprived of it.’ Furthermore, the provision emphasizes that this right shall be exercised ‘in the 
exclusive interest of the people’ Although, the Charter does not define the term ‘peoples,’67 
what is nevertheless clear is that it is meant to be distinct from the State. 68 Baldwin and Morel 
point out that from the practice of the institutions set up under the framework of the African 
Charter it would appear that ‘peoples’ may cover a spectrum including the entire people in a 
country as a collective, a group of people who are a distinct ethnic group within a State and 
                                                 
63
 See http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312314  
Also see Arts.26 and 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 
64
 See North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, [1969] ICJ Rep. 3 and Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary 
Activities Against Nicaragua(Merits), [1989] ICJ Rep.14 
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 James Anaya, Divergent Discourses about International Law, Indigenous Peoples, and Rights over Lands and 
Natural Resources : Towards a Realist Trend, 16 COLORADO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 237-
258(2005) and Benedict Kingsbury, Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual Structures of Indigenous Peoples’ 
Claims in International and Comparative Law, 34 N.Y.U JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND 
POLITICS, 189; 193-202 (2001-2002). 
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 See Art.21 (1). See also common Art. 1(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
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 Ndahinda, Supra note 48 at 191 and 193 
68
 See art.21 of the African Charter which by referring to ‘peoples’ in Paragraphs 1 and 2 and to ‘States Parties’ 
in Paragraphs  4 and 5, shows that these two concepts are not used interchangeably, but are meant to be distinct. 
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even indigenous peoples.69 It is thus broad enough to cover the distinct ethnic groups in the 
Niger Delta.  
 
Over the years the jurisprudence of the African Commission, in cases such as the Social and 
Economic Rights Action Centre and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria[ the 
Ogoni decision] and the Centre for Minority Development and Minority Rights Group 
International (on behalf of the Endorois Welfare Council) v. Kenya [Endorois decision] have 
sought to elucidate the nature of the right of peoples under Article 21 and the obligation 
imposed on State Parties under this provision.70  In the Ogoni decision the African Commission 
found that the facilitation of the Nigerian government of the destruction of Ogoniland and its 
inaction in protecting the Ogoni people from the devastating acts of private actors, especially 
the MNCs as they exploited for oil, was a violation of Article 21 of the African Charter. 71 It 
stated:  
‘The Complainants also allege a violation of Article 21 of the African Charter by 
the government of Nigeria. The Complainants allege that the Military government 
of Nigeria was involved in oil production and thus did not monitor or regulate the 
operations of the oil companies and in so doing paved a way for the Oil 
Consortiums to exploit oil reserves in Ogoniland. Furthermore, in all their dealings 
with the Oil Consortiums, the government did not involve the Ogoni Communities 
in the decisions that affected the development of Ogoniland.   The destructive and 
selfish role-played by oil development in Ogoniland, closely tied with repressive 
tactics of the Nigerian Government, and the lack of material benefits accruing to 
the local population, may well be said to constitute a violation of Article 21.’ 72 
 
The subsequent Endorois decision of the African Commission, whilst construing the Ogoni 
decision, though without referring to a specific paragraph in the latter decision, stated that ‘… 
it is instructive to note that the African Commission decided in The Ogoni case that the right 
to natural resources contained within their traditional lands vested in the indigenous people. 
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 Clive Balwin and Cynthia Morel, Group Rights in Malcolm Evans and Rachel Murray(eds.), THE AFRICAN 
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 Available at http://www.achpr.org/  
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 See Paras. 55  and 58 of the Ogoni decision, Supra note 69 
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 Para.55, Id. 
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This decision made clear that a people inhabiting a specific region within a state can claim the 
protection of Article 21.’73 This decision further pointed that under Article 21(2) of the African 
Charter there is an obligation on the part of the relevant State Party to the Charter in the case 
of spoliation to provide restitution or adequate compensation to the affected indigenous 
peoples.74   
 
The African Charter has been ratified by the Nigeria and its provisions have been domesticated, 
as required by Section 12(1) of the Nigerian Constitution, so it is legally binding on the 
Nigerian government.75 There is therefore an obligation upon the Nigerian government, under 
International Law and Domestic Law, to ensure that the indigenous peoples in the area are 
consulted and they participate in decisions with regard to exploitation of resources in the Niger 
Delta.76 They also have an obligation to ensure that any such exploitation for mineral resources 
on the land of the indigenous peoples in the Niger Delta are carried out in an appropriate 
manner to avoid devastating acts by the private actors involved in such mining activities that 
would result in a loss of access to fundamental resources that are critical for their survival as 
farmers and fishermen. In addition, they have an obligation to provide adequate compensation 
to the indigenous communities therein for any spoliation which occurs in the course of the 
mining of ‘their’ natural resources.77 It does appear that not much has been done in this regard 
for the indigenous peoples in the Niger Delta under Article 21 of the Charter.78  
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IV. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL INITIATIVES WITH REGARD TO 
OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT OF MINERAL RESOURCES OF 
OIL PRODUCING COMMUNITIES IN THE NIGER DELTA. 
 
We see, somewhere above, that the force of community in the Niger Delta is seen as posing a 
challenge to market efficiency and security in the energy industry due to its contribution to the 
social unrest, armed insurgency and inter-community conflict in the region.79 While there is 
extensive literature in such fields as law and human rights, politics and governance, corporate 
social responsibility, development and security studies and environmental management and 
governance on the dynamics of community agitations within this region,80  there appears not 
to be the same level of discussion on the role that regulation and contract negotiation have 
played in the mobilization of the force of community within this region. Even where there are 
academic discussions on the role that law and regulation plays in shaping the force of 
community in the Niger Delta, these discussions have largely focused on legislative 
formulation and not so much on the impact that the contractual framework negotiated between 
international oil companies and the Nigerian federal state has had on indigenous communities 
in their aspirations to participate more fully in the management and control of mineral resources 
that are extracted from their region.81 A key concern of this article is therefore to focus on 
whether the indigenous communities’ struggle for social justice and political relevance in 
resource control is best resolved not only by the restructuring of the legislative framework, but 
also by a re-engineering of the current contractual structures governing natural resource 
exploitation and production in resource rich regions such as the Niger Delta. 
 
A. Fiscal Participation in Revenue Allocation 
As pointed out somewhere above, the current constitutional and legislative framework 
governing the petroleum industry in Nigeria vests ownership of mineral resources in the 
                                                 
on the Implementation of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Nigeria, (Produced by the 
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Nigerian Federal Government. Furthermore, as again pointed out previously, notwithstanding 
that the Federal Government has statutory and constitutional ownership of mineral resources, 
previous constitutions, as well as the current 1999 Constitution, allow oil producing states 
within Nigeria to participate in the sharing of centrally collected mineral revenues through an 
arrangement known as the ‘derivation principle’.82 Whereas earlier constitutions governing the 
first Republic extended the derivation principle to revenue accruing from both onshore and 
offshore resources, it was predominantly restricted by the Distributable Pool Account Decree 
13 of 1970 and the Offshore Revenue’s Decree No 9 of 1971 to revenue derived from onshore 
resources. Decree No 9 in particular vested all offshore oil revenues of the territorial waters 
and the continental shelf adjoining littoral states to the Nigerian federal government. 
Subsequent Nigerian constitutions, including the current 1999 constitution did not expressly 
address the issue on whether littoral states, which coincidentally host many of the host oil 
producing communities, could participate in offshore oil revenues through the derivation 
principle. This constitutional uncertainty eventually led the Nigerian federal government to 
seek judicial interpretation on whether the derivation principle applied to offshore mineral 
resources revenues. In the landmark case of the Attorney General of the Federation v Attorney 
General of Abia State & 35 others, the Supreme Court ruled that the bed of the territorial sea, 
exclusive economic zone and continental shelf belonged to the Nigerian federal government 
rather than the littoral states. In this regard, the Federal Government was to apply the derivation 
principle only to onshore resources. 83  This decision from Nigeria’s highest court 
understandably did little to reduce the worst case ‘flag scenario’ from the Shell trilemma of the 
force of community within the Niger Delta seeking for greater fiscal autonomy and control 
over the mineral resources within the region. A political resolution between the Nigerian 
federal government and the littoral oil producing states concerned led to the legislative 
enactment of the Allocation of Revenue (Abolition of Dichotomy in the Application of the 
Principles of Derivation Act) 2004. This Act allowed littoral states for the purposes of revenue 
sharing to claim two hundred meter water depth Isobaths contiguous to these states. Although 
the oil producing states were partially satisfied with this legislation, non-oil producing states 
challenged its constitutional legitimacy in the Supreme Court. The validity of the 2004 
legislation was upheld by the Supreme Court in a decision seen as having a moderating effect 
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on its previous 2002 decision which had rigidly upheld federal ownership of resources within 
the Nigerian offshore seabed.84  Notwithstanding some misgivings as to whether the Act went 
far enough to address all the concerns for fiscal autonomy, the legislation has to some extent 
tried to resolve the onshore and offshore distinction in revenue sharing, a critical tension point 
in the relations between oil producing states and the Nigerian federal government. However, 
from the discussion on the dynamics between the so-called civic and the primordial publics, it 
is doubtful that the oil producing communities within the oil producing States would in reality 
regard the individual state governments of the oil producing states in which they are located as 
legitimately representing or safeguarding their interests as ‘trustees’ of the derivation fund 
received by the latter. An option would be to allow the oil producing communities to have 
direct fiscal participation in revenue allocation with regard to derivation. The oil producing 
community could be allowed to have a percentage of the revenue derived from oil and gas 
produced from the territory in which the community is located. This revenue could be 
channeled to each particular community through some kind community corporate body, similar 
to the Mackenzie Valley Aboriginal Pipeline Corporation (MVAPC), a corporate entity that 
represents the interest of affected Aboriginal peoples affected by the proposed Mackenzie 
Valley Gas Project in Canada.85  The Community Corporation would mainly be constituted by 
members nominated by the particular oil producing community and would be required to use 
the revenue received from the derivation sharing formula to embark on what the community 
regards as priority developmental projects. The main challenge with direct participation by oil 
producing communities in the derivation fund is that this would require constitutional 
amendment – a process that is rather cumbersome and long drawn.86  
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B. Legislative Initiatives towards Sustainable Community Development in the Niger 
Delta 
 
 As far back as 1959, provision was made in the Nigerian (Constitution) (Amendment No.2) 
Order in Council to establish the Niger Delta Development Board (HC Deb, 1959).  The Board 
was formally constituted in 1961 and amongst other things was responsible for implementing 
agricultural projects within the region. However, its effectiveness in delivering sustainable 
lasting development to communities within the region was questioned and seen by international 
agricultural advisers as having “no clear idea of its objectives”.87 More development initiatives 
for the Niger Delta followed through the promulgation of the Oil Mineral Producing Areas 
Development Commission (OMPADEC) Decree by the then military government in 1992 to 
facilitate sustainable development in the region.  The OMPADEC initiative failed primarily 
due to inefficiency and corruption and also as a result of the inadequate local representation in 
the planning and execution of projects.88 It was subsequently replaced by the Niger Delta 
Development Commission Act (NDDC) 2000. The NDDC Act established a statutory body 
known as the Niger Delta Development Commission which was tasked with the duty to 
formulate policies and guidelines for the development of the region. Its other responsibilities 
as required under section 7 of the Act include the conception, planning and the implementation 
of projects and programs  for the sustainable development of the Niger-Delta area in the field 
of transportation including roads, jetties and waterways, health, education, employment, 
industrialization, agriculture and fisheries, housing and urban development, water supply, 
electricity and telecommunications. While these legislative initiatives, particularly the NDDC 
Act, are seen as positive steps to seek to address the worst flag case scenarios of the force of 
community within this region, the NDDC like its predecessor bodies has been criticized for the 
inadequate representation of indigenous local communities in its decision making process and 
implementation of development plans and projects within the region. It has been strongly 
argued that even though the NDDC may have representatives from oil producing state 
Government; provision should have been made for direct participation from the oil producing 
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communities.89 Apart from inadequate local representation, the NDDC has been faulted for 
structural anomalies and is seen as lacking effective control mechanisms to ensure transparency 
in the administration. Consequently despite several years of establishment, the NDDC is seen 
not to have fully succeeded in its tasks of reconstructing the Niger Delta region or fostering its 
sustainable development.90  Although the criticism of the NDDC is not unfounded, it has 
recorded some measured success in the region through construction of infrastructure such as 
roads and jetties. However,  the efficacy of the NDDC is beclouded by the fact that its enabling 
Act failed to provide a system where its actual beneficiaries- the local communities could 
effectively participate in its decision making process,  hence its limited success in tackling the 
worst case flag scenario of the force of community within the region. 
 
C. Current Soft Laws and Policy Measures on the Development of the Niger Delta 
Realizing that past legislative initiatives set out in the hard law have, to some extent, been 
limited in the full accomplishment of sustainable development in the Niger Delta, the Nigerian 
State has also adopted soft law and policy initiatives to positively engage with the force of 
community within the Niger Delta; these initiatives include the establishment in 2008 of the 
40-member Mittee technical committee tasked with the responsibility of conducting a review 
of existing Niger Delta reports and in advising the Nigerian State on what appropriate steps 
should be undertaken to develop the region. The Mittee Committee in its report recommended, 
inter alia, increasing the derivation percentage for oil producing states as a confidence building 
measure and the disarmament of youths, coupled with the establishment of a Youth 
Employment Scheme.91 Almost simultaneously, the Federal Government set up the Ministry 
for the Niger Delta Affairs which for effective coordination had to absorb the NDDC as one of 
its parastatals.92 These policy measures have yielded some positive dividends in ameliorating 
the worst case flag scenarios of the force of community, highlighted in the Shell Scenarios. For 
instance, the initiation of the amnesty programme by the government of late President Umaru 
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Yar’adua has largely achieved the first of its objectives of disarming the Niger Delta youth 
insurgency. 93 However, it is doubtful that these measures would address the fundamental 
concern of the primordial public of oil communities which has to do with direct stake in fiscal 
federalism and resource control.94 Further, as with previous development bodies constituted by 
the Nigerian government to tackle the developmental concerns of the Niger Delta, the creation 
of the ministry is seen as a “top bottom approach to development” in that there is no clear 
evidence that the local communities within the Niger Delta were actively involved in its 
formation or in deciding its mandate. 95 It is therefore questionable whether the Ministry and 
the NDDC will achieve any better success than other interventionist development bodies like 
OMPADEC similarly tasked with effecting the sustainable development of the Niger Delta 
region. Notwithstanding these reservations, there is still much to be lauded about the ministry 
and the NDDC since its establishment should ensure that developmental needs of the region is 
discussed at the highest level of decision making of the Nigerian government and hopeful this 
should translate into concrete policy measures beneficial to the development of the region.  
 
Notwithstanding that the judicial, legislative and policy initiatives of the Nigerian State have 
yielded some positive results in addressing the worst case flag scenarios of the force of 
community in the Niger Delta, environmental degradation and underdevelopment within the 
region still persists.96 The limited success of state run projects in the development of the region 
has led to a growing involvement of Oil MNCs in the delivery of developmental projects. 
Corporate action in this regard is undertaken through the mechanism of corporate social 
responsibility which is discussed in the section below. 
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V. REVISITING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND ITS 
INTERACTION WITH THE FORCE OF COMMUNITY. 
 
In tandem with the legislative and judicial reforms discussed above, international oil 
companies, the other key stakeholders in the Oil and Gas industry in Nigeria have employed 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as a way of addressing the force of community’s 
demands in the Niger Delta region. Frynas has identified the main CSR concerns that oil and 
gas companies have had to address within this region as the environmental and social impacts 
of the industry and the macro-economic issues created by the inflow of oil revenues. 97  
Interestingly, it will appear that much of the CSR activities carried out in the Niger Delta has 
been more in the area of addressing the social impacts of the industry rather than the 
environmental impacts and micro-economic issues created by the inflow of oil revenues. While 
there is evidence that shows that CSR practices within the oil and gas industry have led to 
voluntary improvements in environmental performance much of the data on how CSR practices 
have improved environmental performance has emerged from other jurisdictions, outside the 
Niger Delta region.98   
 
However, the industry has more recently shifted from its traditional CSR approach that limits 
efforts to community development schemes such as the building of hospitals, roads, schools, 
boreholes and the provisioning of micro-credit schemes to more concrete forms of engagement 
that recognize the right of local communities to be involved in the decision making process on 
how mineral resources are exploited within their region. 99  This new form of corporate 
engagement with local communities is depicted in the negotiation of direct corporate-
community agreements between MNCs and indigenous communities in the Niger Delta. The 
next two sections of this article examines the nature of these agreements and whether they can 
be considered as binding contractual agreement akin to those negotiated between mining 
companies and indigenous communities in Australia and Canada. 
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A. The Emergence of Corporate – Community Agreements in the Niger Delta- a 
current reality or myth?: the General Memorandum of Understanding (GMoU) 
System 
Major oil and gas companies operating in the Niger Delta such as Shell and Chevron have 
employed the Global Memorandum of Understanding (GMoU) system in their engagement 
with local communities. These agreements are normally executed between an oil company and 
a group of local communities.100 For instance Chevron in Nigeria describes the GMoU model 
as: “… a new approach to community engagement in the Niger Delta” and identifies that this 
“gives communities a greater role in managing their development” with the aim of bringing 
peace and stability to those parts of the Niger Delta where the company operates.101 This raises 
questions on the status of GMoUs and whether it has any binding status under law. Clearly, 
although, the GMoU is viewed by both the industry and the local communities as an agreement, 
the key question is whether it creates legally binding terms and conditions against the parties 
to the agreement? While it is claimed that unlike the previous approach of community 
engagement that the GMoU allows communities to take the key decisions and to drive the 
community development there is no evidence to establish that it is a legally binding 
document.102 Generally, though a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) sets out the parties’ 
understanding of a proposed relationship, in many instances, its intent is not to set out binding 
terms and conditions as this would normally be implemented by a subsequent contract. The 
parties usually envisage an MoU as a preliminary document for more detailed negotiations 
which will lead eventually to a final binding contract.103 Consequently under English law, and 
the law of most common law jurisdictions of which Nigeria is a part, MOUs are generally not 
considered as legally binding except they have clauses that are sufficiently certain, such as 
legally binding confidentiality or break-up fees clauses or if they have been supported by 
consideration or if the parties have expressly or implicitly agreed that the MOU should be 
legally binding.104  It is doubtful that the GMoUs executed between oil companies and local 
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communities contain such terms, which for instance may be evident in the MoUs that 
international oil companies execute with national oil companies prior to the execution of the 
final contractual documentation.105 But then it may be argued that the premise on which the oil 
companies have negotiated these GMoU with local communities was essentially based on the 
CSR approach of promoting social responsive behavior in corporate activities within local 
regions; rather than on negotiating binding business terms with these communities, since 
ownership and control of the natural resources is vested with the Federal Government and not 
the local communities. Consequently it may be maintained that despite the industry’s claims 
that the GMoU model empowers local communities by facilitating greater participatory 
processes, such MoUs are not formally designed to have any legal weight.  
 
It is certainly not unusual to have corporate-community agreements that are legally binding. 
For instance, agreements executed between mining companies and aboriginal communities in 
Countries, such as Canada and Australia are considered as legally binding.106 Yet, it must be 
pointed out that the objective of the latter agreements is not just to enable local communities 
to determine what community projects should be initiated, but that these aboriginal 
communities should directly share in the wealth generated from mining activities and be 
involved in the decision-making on which mines should be developed and operated.107  Then 
again there are limitations to having a legally binding GMOU system that seek to transfer 
economic benefits. First, because they are negotiated primarily between companies and local 
communities who lack ownership rights over mineral resources, these Agreements are unable 
to effectually provide for wealth participation clauses in favor of the communities unless the 
Federal Government of Nigeria, which has legal and constitutional rights to ownership and 
control of minerals, is also a party to these agreements.108 Thus, unlike the aboriginal mining 
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agreement model where aboriginal communities are entitled to receive royalties directly from 
mining companies, local communities in the Niger Delta are unable to directly utilize the 
GMOU system as a way to direct access to the economic gains of oil and gas extraction within 
their territory without the direct participation of the Federal Government of Nigeria.109  
 
In 2007 the Nigerian Minerals and Mining Act was enacted and it provides for  Community 
Development Agreements (CDAs), which are meant to transfer ‘social and economic benefits’ 
to the host communities are required to have binding legal effect.110 However, this legislation 
excludes Petroleum from the ambit of this legislation and so legally binding CDAs are not 
applicable to oil and gas mining operations,111 and thus this would not meet the yearnings and 
aspirations of the force of community in the Niger Delta for greater participatory rights over 
the exploitation of oil and gas mineral resources located in their respective communities. 
 
Even so, it must be noted that despite the obvious benefits of the aboriginal mining agreement 
model, it still has some shortcomings similar to the non-binding GMOU system in that there 
are concerns on whether aboriginal communities have the necessary technical skills to 
negotiate specialized agreements with large mining companies and whether such negotiation 
process which in many instances falls outside state controlled community planning may have 
a detrimental effect on government expenditure to the region.112 Moreover, similar to the terms 
of the GMoU, the aboriginal mining agreement model contains specific provisions which 
require the communities to support the project and to refrain from opposing it during the 
environmental impact assessment stage.113 Although, the requirement that local communities 
should support the project is understandable if they are to be seen as partners to the project, 
this requirement may end up causing unintended adverse consequences for these communities. 
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For instance, because a particular local community has contractually agreed to support a 
particular project, it may be regarded as having restricted its rights to access to environmental 
justice through the judicial and regulatory system if such project, in the long run, ends up 
causing environmental degradation within their regions.114 Notwithstanding these concerns, 
the aboriginal mining agreement model does have worthwhile provisions that may be 
considered in any proposed reform of the contractual framework governing the oil and gas 
industry in Nigeria.  
 
In the next section we examine whether there needs to be a complete restructuring of the current 
legal framework, which will allow for the restructuring of the legislative and contractual 
ownership of mineral resources in Nigeria, and provide the appropriate framework for the 
adoption of some form of tripartite mining agreement in the oil and gas industry in Nigeria 
between the Federal Government of Nigeria representing the State, the relevant MNCs and the 
local communities. Recent policy measures, as we would see in the next section, do indicate 
that the Nigerian Government is not averse to a situation where indigenous communities are 
able to directly participate in wealth generated from the exploitation of mineral resources.  
 
VI. TOWARDS A TRIPARTITE CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
THE NIGERIAN STATE, MULTINATIONAL OIL CORPORATIONS 
AND LOCAL COMMUNITIES. 
The Nigerian Government has been reported to have expressed an interest in allowing for direct 
participation of local communities by mooting the idea of transferring ten percent of its stake-
holding in existing JVAs with multinational corporations to local communities.115 In October 
                                                 
114
 Id 
115
 With JVAs one of the partners is generally designated the operator and all the parties are expected to share 
in the cost of operations (cash call obligations). Usually each partner is able to lift and separately dispose of its 
interest share of production, subject of course to the payment of any outstanding profit tax and royalty. There 
are currently six joint venture Agreements between the Federal Government of Nigeria (represented by its 
National Oil Corporation – the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation(NNPC) – and foreign owned oil 
companies, namely: (i). A JVA with Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Limited (Shell) as 
operator. The Parties to the JVA are NNPC (55 percent), Shell (30 percent), Elf (10 percent) and Agip (5 
percent) and operates largely onshore on dry land or in the mangrove swamp; (ii) JVA with Chevron Nigeria 
Limited (Chevron) as operator between NNPC (60 percent) and Chevron (40 percent) with fields located in the 
Warri region west of the Niger river and offshore in shallow water; (iii) JVA with Mobil Producing Nigeria 
Unlimited (Mobil) as operator between NNPC (60 percent) and Mobil (40 percent) which operates in shallow 
water off Akwa Ibom state in the South Eastern Delta. Mobil also holds a 50 percent interest in a Production 
Sharing Contract(PSC) for a deep water block further offshore; (iv) A JVA with Nigerian Agip Oil Company 
Limited(Agip) as operator between NNPC (60 percent), Agip (20 percent) and Phillips Petroleum (20 percent) 
which produces mostly from small onshore fields; (v) JVA with Elf Petroleum Nigeria Limited (Elf) as operator 
 33 
2009, the late President Yar’adua led Federal Government announced plans to give oil 
communities this stake in onshore JVA arrangements as one of the gestures to seek to reduce 
the militancy in the Niger Delta.116 However, not much has been done in this regard since such 
tripartite joint venture agreement would require legislative backing. There have been some 
discussions to include its terms in the draft Petroleum Industry bill currently before the 
Nigerian National Assembly. This is because the bill is designed to effect critical reforms to 
the current legal framework for the Petroleum industry including the negotiation of a new fiscal 
regime for oil and gas exploration. However, it is uncertain if the promise of a ten percent 
equity stake-holding for oil producing communities will finally be included into the bill before 
it is passed considering that it is already facing stiff opposition from international oil companies 
due to its controversial fiscal reforms.117  In the copy of the Petroleum Industry Bill available 
to the authors (there have been different versions as it has travelled through the legislative arm) 
there is no mention of this ten per cent stake in existing JVA. All that the Bill does is to create 
a fund known as the Petroleum Host Communities Fund (PHC Fund), which is to be utilized 
in the development of the economic and social infrastructure of the communities within the 
petroleum producing area. Here the upstream petroleum producing company would be required 
to remit on a monthly basis ten per cent of its net profit into the Fund.118 There is nothing 
fundamentally innovative about this model as it merely introduces the usual top-down 
paternalistic approach that the government has previously adopted through such platforms as 
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the OMPADEC, NDDC, and Niger Delta Ministry. It does not, in the view of the authors, 
provide that ‘ownership’ right for the ethnic communities that the more radical proposal of a 
ten per cent stake in the existing JVAs would entail and therefore is unlikely to adequately 
address ongoing agitations of the force of community within the Niger Delta. The idea of a ten 
per cent stake in existing JVAs which is more innovative would probably stand a better chance 
of getting the primordial public to feel they have an ‘ownership’ stake in ensuring that 
petroleum facilities within their communities are protected and that production is not disrupted.  
 
However, there are certain issues that arise out of what would in essence be tripartite 
Contractual Arrangements between the Nigerian State, Multinational Corporations and Local 
Communities. First, it is important to query whether any such proposal should take into account 
the onshore/offshore distinction established in the Nigerian Supreme Court decision in the 
Attorney General of the Federation v Attorney General of Abia State which interpreted, for the 
purposes of the derivation principle, the offshore seabed and the resources therein as belonging 
to the Federal Government and not the littoral coastal states where oil producing communities 
are situated.119 It is questionable why the Federal Government would restrict communities 
equity stake-holding to only onshore JVAs even if it can be argued that this would still be 
lucrative since of the 606 oil fields in the Niger Delta, 355 are onshore while the remaining 
251 are offshore.120  However, the long term prospects of offshore operations surpassing the 
current output from onshore operations remains feasible and it is doubtful if the agitations of 
the force of community will be resolved by the continued application of the onshore/offshore 
dichotomy in any proposed equity participation sharing schemes for oil producing 
communities, particularly when it can be argued that the whole intent of the Allocation of 
Revenue (Abolition of Dichotomy in the Application of Principle of Derivation) Act 2004 was 
meant to make, at least to an extent, the onshore/offshore distinction immaterial. Further, it is 
unclear how contractual mechanisms necessary to effect the equity participatory framework 
for local communities will operate. Would this be brought about by the principle of novation 
whereby a new party, the oil producing communities, is added to the contractual framework? 
But then novation would normally involve the substitution of a new contract for an existing 
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contract either between the same parties or completely new parties.121 But in this case it is not 
clear if a new contractual framework is being contemplated or a mere variation of the terms of 
the existing agreements with the new party, the oil producing communities, enjoying the ten 
per cent stake from the Federal Government’s share? This may appear to inconsequential, but 
a critical aspect of the JVA arrangement is the cash call obligation of each joint venture 
partners. In transferring a share of its equity stake-holding to oil producing communities would 
the Nigerian government also be transferring the equivalent percentage of its cash call burdens 
to these communities or would it continue to carry the cash call obligations of the communities, 
as well? By transferring a percentage of its stake-holding to these communities is it envisaged 
by the Federal Government that these communities would merely be third party beneficiaries 
who stand to benefit from a contract, but yet in real contractual terms are unable to enforce its 
terms due to the fact that they are not in actuality parties to the contract?122 These are obviously 
vital contractual issues that would need to be addressed if any promise for equity participation 
is to provide any meaningful rights for local oil producing communities.  
 
Recently, there is been a shift in Nigeria from JVAs to a different type of Production contract, 
the Production Sharing Contracts (PSCs), due to difficulties faced by the Federal government 
in meetings its cash call obligations under the JVAs.123 The idea of a typical PSC is for the 
MNC, as contractor, to bear all the exploration and production risks and costs in return for it 
being allowed to recoup its costs from a stipulated share of the production.124 Although, the 
PSCs, unlike the JVAs, would exclude the complication of dealing with cash call obligations 
vis-à-vis the local communities in any proposed equity stake by the latter, it still raises issues, 
just like JVAs, of what exactly is the nature of the contract and the consequential legal 
implications as discussed above in relation to JVAs.  
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As has been mentioned in the previous section, although guidance may be sought from 
aboriginal Agreements on resource exploitation in places like Canada, the situation of Nigeria 
is quite different and more complex because of the ownership structure of natural resources, 
which is wholly vested in the Federal Government.125 However, what is crucial, along the line 
of aboriginal mining agreements, is that such equity participation in the JVAs would have to 
include clearly defined clauses that provides local communities with contractual powers which 
enables them to have greater say in how the JVAs are operated within their territories. This, it 
is argued, will increase the commitment to improved environmental performance of these JVAs  
and will also have a knock on effect of reducing community agitations as the community will 
be seen as owning the projects right from the onset since they have equity participation in the 
JVAs.  But, as has been stated in the preceding section, care must however be taken to ensure 
that the inclusion of this contractual term does not result in restrictions to access to 
environmental justice as has occurred in the case of aboriginal mining agreements in Canada 
and Australia.  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This article has explored the approaches and responses employed by the Nigerian Federal State 
and international oil companies to the negative flag case scenarios, as identified by the Shell 
scenarios, posed by the force of community in mineral resource rich developing regions such 
as the Niger Delta. While this article acknowledges that some of the legislative and judicial 
reforms which have been targeted to enhance the development of the Niger Delta region, along 
with corporate initiatives such as the Global Memorandum of Understanding (GMOU), are 
steps in the right direction to address some of the legitimate concerns of the force of 
community, it identifies some shortcomings with these approaches. It further explores the 
possibility of a restructuring of the contractual framework, along the line of Canadian 
aboriginal mining agreements, but which is negotiated at a tripartite level involving the 
Nigerian Federal Government, MNCs and local oil communities. While this is an innovative 
option to cause the local oil communities to have some sense of ‘ownership’ of the oil and gas 
exploration and production activities with their respective territories, it recognizes that this 
would entail the redefining of contractual relationships in the Nigerian oil and gas industry, 
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undertaken side by side with further radical reforms of the legislative framework that would 
enable the vesting in local oil producing communities actual and direct participatory rights in 
mineral resource ownership and thus provide them with some level of fiscal autonomy. The 
direct stake of these communities through tripartite agreements between the federal 
government, the MNCs and the local communities would go a long way in providing a strong 
just and equitable legal framework that will empower local communities in assuming greater 
responsibility of the management of mineral resources in the Niger Delta region. 
 
    
 
